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Building up Goodwill:  
British Business, Development and Economic Nationalism  




Contemporary sub-Saharan Africa presents a puzzle to many observers, and has 
generally been perceived as a hostile environment to modern business. It is indeed 
difficult to make sense of politics and business on the continent without understanding 
how African colonies turned into independent countries since the late 1950s, and how 
they evolved into postcolonial states from the 1970s onwards. Imperial business was 
witness to these fundamental changes in African societies and deeply affected by it. 
Although some economic indicators in the 1970s were relatively favorable (many 
commodity prices were high), this was the decade when the severe decline of Africa, 
both in relative and absolute terms, began. While the colonial powers had left, imperial 
business stayed behind and forged close links to African political elites in the 1950s and 
1960s. By the 1970s, they were challenged, both in Africa and internationally, as being 
part of a new form of colonialism. Foreign companies became deeply involved in the 
upheavals and challenges in African countries as they learnt to negotiate the treacherous 
political environment before and after independence. 
My PhD dissertation is a study of companies’ quest for legitimacy in times of political 
transformation. In the case of British business in Ghana and Nigeria, these companies 
were moreover relatively disengaged from their host societies, as they had previously 
been able to operate within an imperial culture that allowed them to ignore many 
dissatisfied voices. As firms began to adapt to the new political framework that emerged 
as the British Empire withdrew from its West African colonies, they forged new contacts 
with the new governments and its local workforce. Ghana became independent in 1957 
Disclaimer: This is an electronic version of an article published in Enterprise & Society, and can be found online at: 
 http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/enterprise_and_society/v009/9.4.decker.html 
	 2
and Nigeria followed three years later. Throughout most of the 1950s and 1960s a 
climate of optimism prevailed, but by the 1970s the relationship between foreign 
business and host governments came under severe strain, the roots of which dated back 
to the 1960s and in some cases even the late 1940s and 1930s. What made the 1970s 
such an important decade was the convergence of local and international trends. Within 
African states redistributional struggles could no longer be mitigated effectively, and a 
distinctly African version of a modern state fully came into its own: the postcolonial 
state. This was a state fundamentally based on African traditions of rule and wealth 
accumulation, despite appearing in the guise of a modern constitutional state.  
Internationally, criticism of multinational corporations was ripe, and influential books 
such as Walter Rodney’s “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa” were widely read.i Even 
within international business studies an important scholar like Stephen Hymer, whose 
doctoral dissertation had advanced the field substantially, converted to neo-Marxism and 
condemned the extractive nature of multinationals.ii Governments in Latin America, 
Asia, and Africa demanded greater control and ownership over foreign companies 
operating in their territories. In this climate, companies that had weathered the storms of 
decolonization now found themselves faced with a global wave of expropriations quite 
unlike anything that had occurred before. It has been widely perceived as an attempt of 
developing countries to take control of foreign investment. However, the experience of 
British companies in Nigeria and Ghana tells a different story. Most managed to retain 
control – although three of the companies researched lost parts of their operations. 
From their archives and a close analysis of the actual practice and impact of the specific 
form of legislation that was prevalent in Africa, it becomes clear that multinationals were 
far from the only and even the primary target in this “battle for control”. Throughout the 
1950s and 1960s they had successfully positioned themselves as part and parcel of 
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African development strategies, and although this defense was eroding later on, in the 
1970s they were fairly deeply embedded in the business environment and much of the 
attacks against foreign investors just served to reinforce this trend by increasing the 
collaboration with African partners. 
 
Scope Of This Study 
In my doctoral dissertation I have analyzed corporate responses to deal with political and 
social transformation in culturally and geographically distant host economies. For this I 
chose five British companies that operated in two British West African colonies. The 
companies picked were amongst the most influential firms in commerce (United Africa 
Company, John Holt & Co.), finance (Barclays Bank DCO, Bank of West Africa – later 
Standard Chartered), manufacturing (United Africa Company) and mining (Ashanti 
Goldfields Corporation) in British West Africa in the late 1940s and early 1950s. British 
firms dominated the business world, but French, Swiss, German and US firms were or 
became important in the time period studied. They were similarly affected by the trends 
and problems addressed in the dissertation, but the British firms encountered greater 
antagonism due to their imperial past. The study excludes oil companies, as they were 
late entrants after independence, only invested in Eastern Nigeria, and were dealt with 
separately by the government from the rest of the foreign business community. 
Ghana and Nigeria were chosen as case studies because they are in many ways good 
examples for the experience of new African states. The continent has over 50 states, 
which were mostly colonies of the British, French, Portuguese, Spanish, Germans or 
Belgians, and which varied between settler and non-settler colonies. Hence it is difficult 
to choose two countries that are representative of the whole. Nigeria and Ghana were 
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two of the four countries identified to carry out the majority of expropriations in Africa.iii 
They are also an interesting pair that is frequently studied in African Studies as they are 
similar and different at the same time: both became British colonies around the same 
time in the same region and had been affected by the slave trade before that. Ghana, the 
smaller country, had always been perceived by the British Colonial Office as more highly 
developed than Nigeria. While Ghana went from being relatively wealthy at the 
beginning of my research period (1945), by the 1970s it was considered impoverished. 
The much larger Nigeria, however, became wealthy in national terms due to the 
discovery of substantial amounts of petroleum in the East (though this did not lead to 
great improvements in the livelihoods of the majority of the population). While Ghana 
experimented with Afro-socialism under its first president Kwame Nkrumah and some 
later leaders, Nigeria always remained fairly market-oriented. Nigeria experienced 
significant upheaval as a result of ethnic factionalism that culminated in a civil war from 
1967-1970. Ghana experienced very little ethnic strife, other than a brief period of 
Asante regionalism (the main gold producing area) in the early years of Nkrumah’s rule. 
Synopsis 
My dissertation focuses on how companies managed two very important stakeholder 
groups: government (colonial administration, first independent republics, and the military 
regimes that followed) and labor (black African and white expatriate workforce). The 
time frame is bounded by two phases of high levels of criticism of foreign business in 
Africa. In the late 1940s and early 1950s public protests, boycotts, strikes and riots 
alerted a rather complacent business community to its own unpopularity, while the post-
war Labour government in the UK considered nationalizing large companies such as the 
United Africa Company.  
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The two chapters introducing the two parts of the thesis (Chapters 3 and 6 respectively) 
analyze the corporate response to these challenges by framing their presence in terms of 
their benefits to economic development hand in hand with the implementation of 
welfare and African advancement policies. With this they initially targeted both the 
Colonial Office and African politicians, but the latter became increasingly important. 
Strikes and protests in Ghana and Nigeria were frequently politically inspired, and I argue 
in the dissertation that for Ghana and Nigeria it was between 1952 and 1953 that an 
important, yet mostly politically negotiated switch from colonial reform towards full-
blown decolonization occurred. For most of the 1950s and 1960s, a time period of 
extraordinary prosperity in Africa, British business learnt to find a consensus with 
government over the nature of economic development (Chapters 3 and 4). Around the 
time of the failure of the first independent republics in Nigeria and Ghana in 1966, the 
political networks that firms had built showed signs of eroding (Chapter 5). The 1970s 
turned out to be a decade of widespread expropriations in the developing world, yet in 
Africa they usually took the form of indigenization rather than nationalizations. 
Indigenization means that the government enacts legislation that requires business to sell 
specific percentages to private or public domestic interests depending on the size and 
type of enterprise. Nationalizations were relatively rare, and complete takeover of 
industries only occurred in timber in Ghana, and in the financial industry in Nigeria 
(although the government also took over large parts of the oil industry, which remained 
fairly ineffective due to the lack of technical know-how). Hence although the 1970s were 
widely interpreted as a time period of severe challenge to the ownership and control of 
multinationals in less developed countries, most companies managed to mitigate its 
effects in Africa quite well. The dissertation addresses why this was the case, and why 
business experienced two phases of local protests against its operations separated by a 10 
to 15 years gap of relatively cooperative atmosphere. 
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The second part focuses on labor and the advancement of Africans into managerial posts 
in expatriate companies, which reached significant levels even before the Civil Rights 
Movement in the U.S. became really influential. While comparing trends between civil 
service and private sector as well as between different companies (Chapter 7), I also 
address the internal dynamics that supported or obstructed the promotion of Ghana and 
Nigeria to positions of responsibility (Chapter 8). What has received next to no attention 
in the literature is the fact that Western companies felt consistently threatened by the 
pressure to promote Africans, often more so than by localization and indigenization 
legislation.iv Developing and keeping competent and trusted African staff was an 
important part of corporate goodwill strategies to gain legitimacy in independent Africa. 
The Argument 
As the time frame studied covers over 30 years, the thesis addresses three different 
research debates: one focuses on the early years of decolonization, one relates to the 
whole time frame, and the final one deals with the role of expropriations in the late 
1960s and 1970s. The first research debate comes from imperial history, where several 
authors have analyzed the role of business during decolonization. As a result of choosing 
a longer time frame I disagree with some of their interpretations. The second relates to 
the nature of the development discourse, which has been discussed by both African 
studies and development studies, and to which I add the business dimension. The third 
and final debate that my dissertation contributes to comes from imperial history and the 
social sciences, especially international business, international studies and political 
economy. International business authors have discussed the meaning of expropriations 
and political risk in the 1970s and 1980s, and economists and historians wrote on the 
interpretation of economic nationalism, which is its underlying political expression. I will 
address these three subjects in turn. 
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In recent years imperial history has seen a series of studies on African and Asian 
countries and how Western business behaved during decolonization. The main authors 
are Sarah Stockwell (revising the work of Josephine Milburn), Robert Tignor, Nicholas 
White and Larry Butler.v As White has summarized in his review article of the field in 
2003, most authors agree that business had relatively little influence on governments 
during decolonization.vi Although business was far from unaware or naïve about the 
impact of African nationalism and imperial disengagement on their institutional 
environment, they found it difficult to find support from colonial administration during 
this phase, which White summarized as “a fundamental lack of unity between business 
and government thinking on development and decolonization issues.”vii 
Although different authors qualify this in their respective case studies – Butler recently 
pointed out the pivotal influence of Sir Ronald Prain on the decolonization process in 
Northern Rhodesia/Zambia, and Tignor highlighted the variety of economic policies 
organizing the business sector in Egypt, Kenya and Nigeria – there is a general consensus 
between authors that business and government did not share a common understanding 
of the big political, economic and social questions of the time.viii 
It is this basic understanding that I disagree with, especially with regard to the 
development issues. While there were certainly some company directors vehemently 
opposed to decolonization, like Edward Spear of Ashanti Goldfields in Ghana, 
acceptance of the inevitability of independence was spreading in the business community 
in the 1950s. And although the relationship of British business to the Colonial Office 
was no longer as close as it used to be, it still found access much easier than other 
Western firms or indeed the majority of African ones, where only a few very prominent 
business people gained some political influence.ix As a result of choosing a longer 
research time frame than the imperial studies, which all end at independence (with the 
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exception of Nicholas White, who also wrote on the fate of foreign business in 
independent Malaysia in a separate study)x, my dissertation focuses more on the 
relationships business built with the African politicians that emerged during and after 
decolonization.  
While most of the studies mentioned above focus on the issue of decolonization, my key 
interest lies on the issue of development, which increasingly subsumed a range of social 
and economic issues that had been contested earlier as part of anti-colonial protests. By 
the 1950s, poverty and lack of opportunities for advancement had become part of the 
wider complex of economic development, which was governed by African politicians 
rather than colonial officials, and their expert advisors. The work by Frederick Cooper 
on decolonization and development discourse, as well as an earlier book by Tony Killick 
on development policy in Ghana under Nkrumah, has shown that new African 
governments employed contemporary notions of development to legitimize their own 
rule as well as their position in the international arena.xi My study adds the business angle 
to this argument by showing that companies began to position themselves in 
decolonizing and independent Africa in terms of their own potential contribution to 
development, outlining strategies that were in accord with wider national economic 
planning. 
This strategy, however, reached its natural limitations when the political and economic 
environment became more hostile towards multinational companies in the 1970s. With 
regard to expropriations in Africa, the imperial historian David Fieldhouse has argued 
that the economic nationalism of the late 1960s and 1970s was in effect a delayed 
economic decolonization that was a nail in the coffin of imperial companies such as the 
United Africa Company, as African government sought to wrest economic power from 
their hands.xii Similarly, Stephen J Kobrin argued from an international business 
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perspective that the worldwide trend of expropriations in developing countries 
represented an attempt by host governments to take control over foreign investments.xiii 
I would argue that it was rather an attempt to gain greater leverage on management and 
access to their revenue stream. While bargaining power decidedly shifted in favor of 
African politicians and private businessmen, they only rarely challenged foreign investors 
outright. 
There are a number of competing approaches that fit my interpretation of most cases of 
African economic nationalism, especially if of a similar type than the one found in Ghana 
and Nigeria (i.e. indigenization, which was the most commonly used type of legislation in 
Africa). Paul Collins argued that expropriations were intricately connected to cases of 
redistributional struggles within African countries, a point that Thomas Biersteker also 
made in his study of Nigeria.xiv More than a decade earlier, two economists had proposed 
a conceptual framework for economic nationalism in developing countries, based on the 
Canadian case: Albert Breton suggested that economic nationalism in Canada served 
internal political purposes, and Harry G Johnson extended this idea to the “new states” 
of the 1960s.xv He argued that countries that chose to follow economic nationalism 
traded off the benefits ordinarily derived from free competition for a psychological good: 
the satisfaction of having national ownership of significant parts of the domestic 
economy. More importantly, national ownership ensured that some groups experienced 
better economic opportunities through employment and commercial openings for 
nationals. These groups had often captured the state and managed to implement policies 
that served their own interests disproportionately compared the majority of the 
population.  
Precisely this view has been put forward by political scientists working on Africa. Robert 
Bates, in his study of agrarian politics in African states, came to the conclusion that 
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coalitions between large farmers, government bureaucrats and large companies conspired 
to create conditions that would shelter them from greater competition, hence ensuring 
windfall profits, which were ultimately gained at the expense of the politically 
marginalized and poor in the country.xvi 
All of these interpretations, although few of them specifically focus on business, offer a 
much more convincing framework to explain my archival findings than Fieldhouse and 
Kobrin’s argument that countries sought to gain control from multinationals. This was 
not convincing for two reasons. Firstly, as already stated, few companies actually entirely 
lost control of their investments, though Nigeria was certainly rich enough to nationalize 
all business (due to its significant oil wealth) and Ghana’s government was radical and 
isolated enough to at least attempt it. Yet there were only a few politicians and 
bureaucrats fully committed to nationalizing foreign companies. Moreover, the 
international climate was quite favorable for countries seeking to control economic 
activities: theories of underdevelopment had widespread support; the power of OPEC 
shook the Western governments and expropriations were also occurring in Asia and 
Latin America. All of these factors significantly undermined the bargaining power of 
foreign investors. 
Secondly, some investors lost their enterprise as a result of indigenization decrees in 
Ghana and Nigeria – but they were not Western multinationals. They were mostly micro, 
small or medium-sized enterprises run by other African nationals or Lebanese, who 
directly competed with Ghanaians and Nigerians.xvii Ghana also expelled foreigners 
without documentation (i.e. other African nationals) in the late 1960s (including many 
Nigerians) and Nigeria did the same in the early 1980s (which, amongst others, affected 
many Ghanaians). This domestic element of redistributional struggles has mostly been 
ignored by the standard interpretations. Foreign multinationals were obviously also 
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affected by these decrees, but they had been part of the coalitions described by Bates, 
and they could frequently negotiate the impact on their operations. In most cases the 
goal was to ensure a greater share for domestic interests in the profits made by 
multinationals, and the legislation was clearly geared towards this objective (by forcing 
companies to sell equity locally at artificially depressed prices in order to ensure more 
profits to be retained by Nigerians and Ghanaians – although the individuals benefitting 
were clearly already wealthy and politically well-connected).  
Both in the Ghanaian as well as the Nigerian case this course of events was preceded by 
economics shocks: Ghana’s economy collapsed, large numbers of people left the 
country, the remaining ones resorted to smuggling and the black market. In Nigeria, the 
opposite happened: the discovery of oil lead to an enormous influx of petro-dollars, 
which upset the internal price and wage levels and made traditional commercial pursuits 
(especially export crops) uncompetitive. As the oil wealth was far from evenly distributed 
or invested productively, and moreover served to fuel a bitter civil war, it did not 
materially improve the standard of living in the country for the vast majority of 
Nigerians.  
By revising long-held assumptions about the nature of economic nationalism in Africa 
and establishing the importance of the internal changes in business with regard to control 
arrangements and racial composition of management, my dissertation provides a new 
approach to one of the most significant periods of time in recent African history. It 
offers a new explanation of the relationship between foreign business and postcolonial 
governments and reinterprets the nature of political risk faced by companies in Africa 
after decolonization. 
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